Statewide Const., Inc. v. Pietri Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 36934 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-12-2010
Statewide Const., Inc. v. Pietri Respondent's Brief
Dckt. 36934
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Statewide Const., Inc. v. Pietri Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36934" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2464.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2464
I N  THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDARO 
STATEWIDE CONSTRUCTION, INC. / Supreme Court Case No. 36934 
SEQUOIA PIETRI, LUKE CRAWFORD, 
JIM CRAWFORD AND MAGGIE 
CRAWFORD, LONNIE R. KING and 
CHARLENE KING, husband and wife, M&T 
MORTGAGE, LARRY MONKARSH, 
FIRST HORIZON HOME LOANS, ESTATE 
OF RAYMOND PIATT, ANTHONY F. 
FRONTINO, GERRY LEE IKOLA and 
ELLEN I. IKOLA, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
On Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County 
of Ada. The Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge, Presiding. 
Thomas G. Walker, ISB No. 1856 
Mackenzie Whatcott, ISB No. 6774 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
800 Park Blvd., Suite 790 
P.O. Box 8518 
Boise, Idaho 83707-9518 
Telephone: (208) 344-781 1 
Facsimile: (208) 338-3290 
Attorneys for PlaintifEBespondent 
Jed W. Marrwarirrg, ISB No. 3040 
Victor S. Villegas, ISB No. 5860 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 W. Main St. 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
Attorneys for DefendantslAppelfants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I . STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................... 5 
A . Nature of the Case .............................................................................................................. 5 
B . Course of the Proceedings .................................................................................................. 5 
C . Statement of Facts .............................................................................................................. 8 
I1 . STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................................... 9 
............................................................... I11 . RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS 11 
A . The Statement of Legislative Intent does not prohibit Statewide's relocation of the Old 
Easement ................................................................................................................................... 12 
B . Idaho Code Section 55-313 permits a servient estate owner to move an easement without 
consent from the dominant estate owner ................................................................................ 17 
1 . Idaho Code Section 55-313 does not require consent of dominant estate owners to 
........................................................................................................ relocate the easement 17 
..................... 2 . Statewide's relocation does not violate a constitutionally protected right 24 
C . No genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Appellants' alleged injury ................ 27 
D . Idaho Code Section 55-3 13 is not unconstitutional because the relocation of an easement 
doesnot constitute a "taking" and Appellant's due process rights have not been violated ...... 29 
IV . CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 30 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
548340-3 
Page 2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Argyle v . Slemaker. 107 Idaho 668. 691 P.2d 1283 (Ct.App.1984) ............................................ 11 
Banner Life Ins . Co . v . Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust. 147 Idaho 117. 206 P.3d 481 
(2009) .................................................................................................................................... 9. 29 
Baxter v . Craney. 135 Idaho 166. 16 P.3d 263 (2000) ............................................................. 9. 10 
Benninger v . DerzFeld. 142 Idaho 486. 129 P.3d 1235 (2006) ..................................................... 23 
Blackwell Lumber Co. v . Empire Mill Co.. 28 Idaho 556. 155 P . 680 (1916) .............................. 26 
Boydstun Beach Ass'n v . Allen. 11 1 Idaho 370. 723P.2d 914 (Ct.App. 1986) ............................ 20 
Brian v . Bowlus. 399 So.2d 545 (La.1980) .......................................................................... 6. 7. 19 
Bromley v . Garey. 132 Idaho 807. 979 P.2d 1165 (1999) ............................................................ 10 
City of Pocatello v . State. 145 Idaho 497 180 P.3d 1048 (2008) .................................................. 12 
Cohen v . Larson. 125 Idaho 82. 867 P.2d 956 (1993) ................................................. 19. 24. 25 
. Cozby v . Armstrong. 205 S W.2d 403 (Tex.Civ.App. 1947) ......................................................... 19 
............................................. Doe v . Durtschi. 110 Idaho 466. 716 P.2d 1238 (1986) 10. 11. 13. 17 
Drew v . Sorensen. 133 Idaho 534. 540. 989 P.2d 276. 282 (1999) .............................................. 24 
Hagerman Water Right Owners. 130 Idaho at 732. 947 P.2d at 405 ..................................... 11. 13 
Kelo v . City ofNew London. Connecticut. 545 U.S. 469. 125 S.Ct. 2655. 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005) 
............................................................................................................................................. 25. 26 
Land and Minerals. Inc . v . Hawkes. 138 Idaho 543. 66 P.3d 798 (2003) ................................... 13 
MacMeekin v . Low Income Housing Institute. Inc.. 45 P.3d 570 (Wash.Ct.App.2002) ... 18. 19. 21 
Marshall v . Blair. 130 Idaho 675. 946 P.2d 975 (1997) ............................................................... 23 
................................ Millson v . Laughlin. 217 Md . 576. 142 A.2d 810. 80 A.L.R.2d 731 (1958) 19 
Moss v . Mid-Am . Fire & Marine Ins . Co.. 103 Idaho 298. 647 P.2d 754 (1982) ......................... 10 
Ponderosa Home Site Lot Owners v . Garfield Bay Resort. Inc., 139 Idaho 699. 85 P.3d 675 
.................................................................................................................................. (2004) 13. 14 
Potlach Corp . v . United States. 134 Idaho 912. 12 P.3d 1256 (2000) .......................................... 12 
........................................ Potlach Lumber Co.. v . Peterson. 12 Idaho 769. 88 P . 426 (1906) 25 . 26 
Riverside Dev . Co . v . Ritchie. 103 Idaho 515. 650 P.2d 657 (1982) ............................................ 11 
................................ Sedillo Title Guaranty. Inc . v . Wagner. 80 N.M. 429. 457 P.2d 361 (1 969) 19 
Stamatis v . Johnson. 71 Ariz . 134. 224 P.2d 201 (Ariz.1950) ...................................................... 18 
State v . Doe. 144 Idaho 796. 172 P.3d 551 (Ct.App. 2007) ................................................. 11. 13 
State v . Hagerman Water Right Owners. 130 Idaho 727. 947 P.2d 400 (1997) ........................... 12 
............................................................. Stewart v . Compton. 549 S.W.2d 832 (Ky.Ct.App. 1977) 19 
Student Loan Fund of Idaho. Inc . v . Duerner. 131 Idaho 45. 951 P.2d 1272 (1997) ................... 10 
Tingley v . Harrison. 125 Idaho 86. 867 P.2d 960 (1994) ......................................................... 10 
Turner v . Coldsprings Canyon. L.P.. 143 Idaho 227. 141 P.3d 1096 (2000) .............................. 23 
Villager Condominium Ass'n v . Idaho Power Co.. 121 Idaho 986. 829 P.2d 1335 (1992) .......... 22 
Worley Highway Dist . v . Yacht Club ofCoeur d' Alene. 116 Idaho 219. 75 P.2d 11 1 (1989) ..... 14 
............................. Yellowstone Pipe Line Co . v . Drummond, 77 Idaho 36. 287 P.2d 288 (1955) 29 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF Page 3 
548340-3 
Statutes 
I.C. § 40-109(5) ............................................................................................................................. 16 
I.C. 5 42-1207 ............................................ .................................................................................. 22 
I.C. 7-717 ................................................................................................................................... 29 
Rules 
I.R.C.P. 56(c) ................................................................................................................................ 10 
Treatises 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY. SERVITUDES 4.8(3) (2000) ................................ 20. 22. 28 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
548340-3 
Page 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal involves the issue of whether a servient estate owner may relocate a roadway 
easement without the consent of the dominant estate owners. The DefendantsIAppellants, 
Sequoia Pietri, Luke Crawford, Jim Crawford, Maggie Crawford, Lonnie King, Charlene King 
and Larry Monkarsh (collectively referred to as "Appellants") are appealing the Honorable 
Michael R. McLaughlin's conclusion that the Respondent Statewide Construction, Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Statewide"), as the servient estate owner, has the right to relocate a 
roadway easement under Idaho Code Section 55-313 without obtaining the consent of the 
Appellants, who are the dominant estate owners. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Statewide filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment ("Complaint") on 
October 31, 2008, wherein Statewide sought a judgment concluding that a roadway easement 
that existed on its property could be relocated without the consent of the dominant estate owners. 
The Complaint named the following Defendants: the Appellants, M&T Mortgage, First Horizons 
Home Loans, the Estate of Raymond Piatt, Anthony F. Frontino, Gerry Lee Ikola and Ellen I. 
Ikola. (R. Vol. I, p. 1.) Appellants filed an Answer on November 26,2008. (R.Vol. I, p. 26.) 
On November 21, 2008, a Declaratory Judgment as Against Geny Lee & Ellen I Ikola 
was entered based upon a stipulation that the roadway easement could be relocated. (R. Vol. I, p. 
21.) 
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On December 16, 2008, a Declaratory Judgment as Against Anthony F. Frontino was 
entered based upon a stipulation that the roadway easement could be relocated. (R. Vol. I, p. 
34.) 
On January 8, 2009, Statewide moved for the entry of a default judgment against 
Defendant Estate of Raymond Piatt. (Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 1-6.) A Default Judgment Against 
Estate of Raymond Piatt was entered on January 26,2009. (R. Vol. I, p. 42.) 
On January 20, 2009, Statewide moved for the entry of a default judgment against 
Defendant First Horizon Home Loans. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 7-12.) A Default Judgment Against 
First Horizon Home Loans was entered on January 26,2009. (R. Vol. I., p. 39.) 
On February 25, 2009, Statewide moved for the entry of a default judgment against 
Defendant Wells Fargo Mortgage, Inc. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 13-19.) A Default Judgment as to 
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage was entered on February 27,2009. (R. Vol. I, p. 65.) 
As of February 27, 2009, six of the originally named defendants had either stipulated to a 
declaratory judgment or allowed default to be entered against them. On April 16, 2009, 
Statewide filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that a declaratory judgment be 
entered against the remaining seven defendants, the Appellants in this Appeal. (Supp. R. Vol. I, 
p. 20.) Statewide's motion for summary judgment was supported by a legal memorandum and 
affidavits filed by Brian Wanner and Thomas G. Walker. (Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 23-71.) 
The Appellants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2009. (Supp. R. 
Vol. I, p. 109). The Appellant's cross-motion was supported by a legal memorandum and the 
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affidavits of Larry Monkarsh, Luke Crawford, Victor Villegas, Sequoia Pietri, and Lonnie King. 
(Supp. R. Vol. I. pp. 1 1 1-162.) 
Statewide opposed Appellant's cross-motion and filed a legal memorandum both in 
support of its own motion and in opposition to Appellant's cross-motion which was supported by 
an affidavit submitted by Brian Wanner. (Supp. R. Vol. 11, pp. 163-361, Supp. R. Vol. 111, pp. 
362-447.) 
On June 9,2009, Statewide filed a motion to strike portions of the testimony contained in 
Appellants' supporting affidavits. (Supp. R. Vol. 111, p. 448.) On June 16, 2009, Appellant's 
submitted a reply brief supported by an affidavit submitted from Cynda Herrick ( "Herrick 
Affidavit"). (Supp. R. Vol. 111, pp. 461-468,477-489.) Statewide subsequently moved to strike 
the affidavit of Cynda Herrick. (Supp. R. Vol. 111, p. 494.) 
On June 23, 2009, the district court heard oral argument on the parties' motions for 
summary judgment and Statewide's motions to strike. (Tr., p. 5, L. 1-25.) The court issued its 
Memorandum Decision on: 1) Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; and 2) Defendant's 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on July 15, 2009. (R. Vol. I, p. 80.) The Honorable 
Michael R. McLaughlin granted Statewide's motion for summary judgment and denied 
Appellant's motion for summary judgment. (Id.) The district court struck portions of the 
Appellants' affidavits that called for legal conclusion, but denied the motion with regard Lo the 
remainder of the testimony. (R. Vol. I, p. 80.) 
The court issued a Judgment on September 2, 2009, but inadvertently failed to executed 
and attach a Rule 54(b) Certificate. (R. Vol. I, p. 94.) Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 
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September 23, 2009. (R. Vol. I, p. 98.) When counsel noticed that the Rule 54(b) Certificate 
was not attached to the Judgment, the parties entered into a Stipulation for Entry of Rule 54(b) 
certificate.' 
C. Statement of Facts 
Statewide is an Idaho corporation in good standing. (R. Vol. I, p. 2, 1 1.2.) Statewide 
owns real property in Valley County, Idaho consisting of approximately 15.18 acres, referred to 
as "Parcel 1." (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 40, 1[ 3.) Parcel 1 is the "servient estate" over which an 
easement provides for ingress and egress to seven parcels, the "dominant estate." (Supp. R. Vol. 
I, p. 40,TT 4-6.) 
Sequoia Pietri and Luke Crawford own Parcel No. 2. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 40, 17 7-8.) 
Jim and Maggie Crawford claim an interest in Parcel 2. (Id.) Lonnie R. King and Charlene King 
own Parcel No. 3. (Id.) Lawrence S. Monkarsh owns Parcel No. 4. (Id.) Lonnie King owns 
Parcel No. 6. (Id.) 
Statewide made application to Valley County for a Conditional Use Permit on May 31, 
2005 to develop a seven-lot subdivision on Parcel 1. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 41,T 9.) Following the 
required notices and hearings, Valley County issued Conditional Use Permit No. 05-3 1, recorded 
as Instrument No. 298630, records of Valley County, Idaho. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 41, 1 10.) 
Conditional Use Permit No. 05-31 provides for the construction of a new roadway for purposes 
of access to the improved lots on Parcel 1 and for ingress and egress to the dominant estate. 
' The district court issued the Rule 54(b) Certificate on February 23,2010, nuncpro func to September 2,2009. No 
citation to the record on appeal was available as of the date of Respondent's brief. The parties submitted a 
Stipulation to Augment the Clerk's Record on Appeal on or about March 5, 2010. The augmented record was not 
received prior to the filing date of this brief. 
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(Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 41, 7 11.) The construction of the new roadway required relocation of 
easement serving the dominant estate. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 41,T 12.) Statewide dedicated a 70 
foot wide easement and constructed a roadway thereupon in accordance with Valley County 
standards ("New Easement"). (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 41,T 13.) Since the roadway was constructed 
in accordance with its standards, Valley County will assume maintenance and repair 
responsibilities for the New Easement and roadway. 
Vacation of the original easement ("Old Easement") and relocation of the roadway to the 
New Easement does not obstruct ingress to or egress from Parcels 2 through 8. (Supp. R. Vol. I, 
p. 41,Y 14 , p p  46-47.) Statewide requested the owners of Parcels 2 through 8 to consent to the 
vacation of the Old Easement and relocation of the roadway to the New Easement. Sequoia 
Pietri and Luke Crawford (Parcel No. 2), Jim and Maggie Crawford (Parcel 2), Lonnie R. King 
and Charlene King (Parcel No. 3), and Lawrence S. Monkarsh (Parcel No. 4) have refused to 
consent to the vacation of the Old Easement and relocation of the roadway to the New Easement. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 26.) 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from an order granting a party's motion for summary judgment, this Court 
employs the same standard of review that the trial court uses in ruling on the motion. Banner 
Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 123-24, 206 P.3d 481, 
487-88 (2009), citing Buxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (2000). S m a r y  
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents before the court 
indicate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Bawter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267. The 
moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Buxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267. 
In construing the record on a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences 
and conclusions must be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Student Loan 
Fund ofldako, Inc. v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45,49,951 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1997). The nonmoving 
party, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but 
the party's response, by affidavits or ... otherwise ..., must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e); Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267. "A 
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact," but circumstantial 
evidence may suffice. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994); Doe v. 
Durtscki, 110 Idaho 466,470,716 P.2d 1238,1242 (1986). Still, the evidence offered in support 
of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. Bromley v. Garey, 
132 Idaho 807,811,979 P.2d 1165,1169 (1999). 
The fact that both parties file motions for summary judgment does not necessarily mean 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Moss v. Mid-Am. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 
Idaho 298, 302, 647 P.2d 754, 758 (1982). Moreover, the filing of cross-motions for summary 
judgment does not transform "the court, sitting to hear a summary judgment motion, into the trier 
of fact." Id. When cross-motions have been filed and the action will be tried before the court 
without a jury, however, the court may, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, draw 
probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritckie, 
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103 Idaho 515,519,650 P.2d 657,661 (1982); see also Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534,537, 
989 P.2d 276,279 (1999). Drawing probable inferences under such circumstances is permissible 
since the court, as the trier of fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at 
trial. Ritchie, 103 Idaho at 519, 650 P.2d at 661. Conflicting evidentiary facts, however, must 
still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party. Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 
P.2d 1283, 1285 (Ct.App.1984). 
11. RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS 
Appellants argue that whether a servient estate owner may relocate a roadway easement 
requires a '"two-prong analysis" which first requires the parties to satisfy the Statement of 
Legislative Intent to Idaho Code Section 55-313, and then look to the language of the statute 
itself to determine whether such relocation will injure any person using or interested in such 
access. Appellants assert, "Unless a landowner can satisfy this two-pronged analysis, relocation 
of the private roadway is not permitted." (Appellants' Brief, p. 4.) Appellants do not cite any 
legal authority to support this claim. Not only is this not the law in Idaho, but Statewide is not 
aware of any legal authority that would require an Idaho court to $rst look to a Statement of 
Legislative Intent and satisfy any comments included therein before looking at the express 
language of the statute. Idaho law is the exact opposite; it requires the courts to first look at the 
express language of the statute and then, only if the statute is ambiguous, resort to a review of the 
legislative history or intent. See State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 796, 172 P.3d 551 (Ct.App. 
2007)(emphasis added); see also Thomas v. Worthington, 132 Idaho 825, 829, 979 P.2d 1183, 
1187 (1999); Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho at 732, 947 P.2d at 405; City of Sun 
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Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665,667, 851 P.2d 961,963 (1993) ("We have consistently 
held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic 
evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislature.") 
As set forth in more detail below, Idaho Code Section 55-3 13 is clear and unambiguous 
and therefore does not require any consideration of legislative history or intent. 
A. The Statement of LegisIative Intent does not prohibit Statewide's relocation 
of the Old Easement. 
As the district court correctly held, the Statement of Legislative Intent relative to Idaho 
Code Section 55-313 does not prohibit Statewide's relocation of the Old Easement. Despite 
Appellants' argument that the court is required to first look at the Statement of Legislative Intent, 
it is well-established in Idaho that the court must first look to the plain language of the statute. 
"When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the plain language. '[Ilf ... the statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in 
any statutory construction. Statutory interpretation begins with the words of the statute, giving 
the language its plain, obvious and rational meanings."' City of Pocatello v. State, 145 Idaho 497, 
501, 180 P.3d 1048, 1052 (2008), citing State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 
732, 947 P.2d 400, 405 (1997). The courts "will resort to judicial construction only if the 
provision is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws. There is no 
need to go beyond the language of the statute, when that language is clear and unambiguous." 
City of Pocatello, supra; Potlach Corp. v, United States, 134 Idaho 912, 914, 12 P.3d 1256, 1258 
(2000). "If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to 
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legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation." State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 796, 172 P.3d 551 
(Ct.App. 2007)(emphasis added); see also Thomas v. Worthington, 132 Idaho 825, 829, 979 P.2d 
1183, 1187 (1999); Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho at 732, 947 P.2d at 405; City of 
Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993) ("We have 
consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other 
extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent 
of the legislature.") 
Idaho Code Section 55-313 is clear and unambiguous and provides: 
Relocation of access.-Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which is less 
than a public dedication, has heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed 
across private lands, the person or persons owing or controlling the private lands 
shall have the right at their own expense to change such access to any other part 
of the private lands, but such change must be made in such a manner as not to 
obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using 
or interested in such access. 
Idaho Code $ 55-313. The statute provides that any access "which is less than a public 
dedication" may be changed by the persons owning or controlling the private lands at their own 
expense. The Old Easement was not dedicated to the public. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 40,1[5.) 
A dedication is essentially the setting aside of real property for the use or ownership of 
others. Ponderosa Home Site Lot Owners v. Garjeld Bay Resort, Inc., 139 Idaho 699, 701, 85 
P.3d 675, 677 (2004). Idaho recognizes a common law dedication of land both for public, as 
well as for private use. Sun Valley Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Hmvkes, 138 Idaho 543, 548, 66 
P.3d 798, 803 (2003). Public dedications are accomplished either statutorily or by the common 
law. Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club of Coeur d' Alene, 116 Idaho 219,222, 775 P.2d 11 1, 
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114 (1989). Common law dedications to the public must satisfy a two-part test. "The elements 
of common law dedication are (1) an offer by the owner clearly and unequivocally indicating an 
intent to dedicate the land and (2) acceptance of the offer." Ponderosa Home Site Lot Owners, 
supra. "The offer to dedicate may be made in a number of ways, including the act of recording 
or filing a subdivision plat depicting the specific areas subject to dedication, so long as there is a 
clear and unequivocal indication the owner intends to dedicate." Id. With regard to the Old 
Easement, there is no previously recorded plat indicating an intent to dedicate the easement to 
the public. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 40,T 6.) Statewide never had any intention of dedicating the Old 
Easement to the public. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 40, 7 6.) The district court correctly held that the 
Old Easement falls within the ambit of "any access which is less than a public dedication." 
Despite the unambiguous language contained in Section 55-313, Appellant's argue that 
this Court should consider the Statement of Legislative Intent that provides: 
STATEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
H 264 
It is the intent of the Legislature that the phrase "any access which is less than a 
public dedication" in H 264 shall not include any access that is part of a public 
highway system 
(Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 129.)(quotations and bolding in original). Appellants argue that the intent of 
the Legislature should be extrapolated from discussions on House Bill 264 in the Senate 
Transportation Committee and cite to minutes from that meeting summarizing some concerns 
expressed by Senator Manning: 
Mr. Manning expressed concern with the possible effects on highway 
access. He feels this could allow someone to move access roads without checking 
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with the highway district or ITD. It could endanger the public or users of the 
land. 
(Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 127.) 
Statewide complied with Valley County's application process and provided the requisite 
notice and hearing prior to obtaining the Conditional Use Permit. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 40, l  10.) 
The location of the New Easement was approved by the Valley County Highway District. (Supp. 
R. Vol. I, p. 40, 7 13.) The roadway over the New Easement was designed to Valley County 
standards and specifications and was accepted by the County into its road system. (Supp. R. Vol. 
I, p. 4 0 , l  10.) Mr. Manning's concerns are more than satisfied by Valley County's application 
and approval process. 
Appellants hrther claim that the district court misunderstood their argument and\assert 
that the issue focuses on a private road's "access" onto a pubIic road. Appellant's now claim 
that, "the first test to determine whether a landowner may use Section 55-313 to relocate a 
private road focuses on whether the relocation involves changing the road's existing access onto 
a public highway." (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) This test is not included within the express 
language of Idaho Code Section 55-3 13 which addresses "any access which is less than public 
dedication." Moreover, this test is also not included in the Statement of Legislative Intent upon 
which Appellants rely. The Statement of Legislative Intent states "'any access which is less than 
a public dedication' in H 264 shall not include any access that is part of a public highway 
system." It does not state "access to a public highway" as argued by Appellants. 
The Old Easement accesses Smylie Lane which is a county road. The New Easement 
moves the access point approximately 300 feet. Neither the Old Easement nor the New 
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Easement is part of a "public highway system" as defined in the'1daho statutes. The district court 
was correct when it explained, 
The Defendants argue that because the easement connects to a public road, it is 
part of the public highway system. However, this reading of the intent would 
make section 55-313 inapplicable in nearly all cases because virtually every 
easement that allows use of motor vehicles eventually connects to the public 
highway system. Stated differently, just because a road connects to the public 
highway system does not necessarily mean it is "part of a public highway 
system." 
(R. Vol. I, p. 87.) 
The argument Appellants are making now is the same argument they made to the district 
court. The district court used the phrase "connects to" which is synonymous with "access." 
Appellants continue to argue that Statewide cannot relocate the easement because it accesses a 
public road. A private road that accesses or connects to a county road cannot be interpreted as 
part of a "public highway system," if this were the case then every private road in Idaho would 
be fall within a public highway system because all roads eventually access a public highway. 
Idaho Code Section 5 40-109(5) defines "Highways" as "roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid 
out or established for the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public ..." A "County Highway 
System" is defined in Section 40-104 and provides in part, "all public highways in a coun ty..." 
A "State Highway System" is defined in Section 40-120 and provides, "the principal highway 
arteries-in the state, including connecting arteries and extensions through cities, and includes 
roads to every county seat in the state." The Statement of Legislative Intent does not qualify the 
"public highway system" as either County or State. 
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When a court is required to engage in statutory construction it has the duty to ascertain 
the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Doe, supra. "To ascertain the intent of the 
legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of 
those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." Id. Taking into 
account the words in the statute, the statement of legislative intent as well as the committee 
minutes, it is clear that the Legislature's concern was safety with regard to transportation on 
public highways. That concern was been met by Valley County's Conditional Use Permit 
application and approval process. 
B. Idaho Code Section 55-313 permits a sewient estate owner to move an 
easement without consent from the dominant estate owner. 
The district court correctly found as a matter of law that the roadway easement could be 
relocated without causing injury to the Appellants under Section 55-313. 
1. Idaho Code Section 55-313 does not require consent of dominant estate 
owners to relocate the easement. 
Appellant's claim that lack of unanimous consent amounts to per se injury under Idaho 
Code Section 55-313 is simply illogical. Section 55-313 permits the relocation of an access way 
only if the change does not "obstruct motor vehicle travel" or "otherwise injury any person or 
persons using" the access. As plainly stated by the district court, "if consent was required to 
relocate, the statute would simply say so. Instead, the statute provides for relocation so long as 
the easement does not obstruct motor vehicle travel or otherwise injure any person using the 
easement." (R. Vol. I, p. 88.) Moreover, as correctly noted by the district court, "if any unilateral 
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relocation was per se injurious, section 55-313 and the language regarding injury to any person 
using the easement would be wholly ineffective." (Id.) 
Appellants include a lengthy discussion in their brief to this Court arguing that other 
foreign jurisdictions have held that consent is required of the dominant estate owners. This 
argument ignores the fact that Idaho has a statute that addresses this issue and does not require 
consent. 
Rather than follow the directive of Idaho Code Section 55-313, Appellant's ask this Court 
to adopt Arizona case law as set forth in Stamatis v. Johnson, 71 Ariz. 134, 136-137, 224 P.2d 
201,202-203 (Ariz.1950). Appellants arg ue that Stamatis "is in accord with Idaho case law 
and Idaho statutes." (Appellant's Brief, p. 11 .) However, the holding in Stamatis is not in accord 
with Idaho case law and statutes because it directly conflicts with idaho Code Section 55-313. 
Moreover, Appellants' reliance on Stamatis and MacMeekin v. Low Income Housing Institute, 
Inc., 45 P.3d 570,575 (Wash.Ct.App.2002) is misplaced because neither Arizona nor Washington 
has a statute similar to Idaho Code Section 55-313.~ Moreover, the Stamatis decision explains, 
"As a general rule, in the absence of statutes to the contrary, the location of an easement cannot 
be changed by either party without the other's consent ..." Stamatis, 71 Ariz. at 137, 224 P.2d at 
203 (emphasis added). Clearly, Idaho Code Section 55-313 constitutes a "statute to the contrary." 
Additionally, the Stamatis court cites to an earlier decision that provides, "But, even if it were 
shown that the change would be an actual benefit to the respondents, we would have no power to 
compel them to accept the benefit. The question is one of property rights, not of benefits or 
Counsel for Statewide has conducted lengthy legal research utilizing Westlaw to locate a similar statute in 
Washington and Arizona and has been unable located one. 
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injuries." Stamatis, 71 Ariz. at 1387,224 P.2d at 203, citing White Bros. & Crum Co. v. Watson, 
64 Wash. 666, 117 P. 497,499 (191 1). This rationale is also contrary to Section 55-313 because 
that statute specifically addresses injury. 
The Washington Court of Appeals decision in MacMeekin is also not applicable in this 
case. The MacMeekin court rejected the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)(2000) and 
held that under Washington law consent was required from the dominant estate holders before 
the servient estate owner could relocate an easement. Notably, in MacMeekin the court 
addressed a number of other jurisdictions that approve unilateral or court-ordered relocation. 
MacMeekin, 11 1 Wash.App. at 203,45 P.3d at 577, citing Millson v. Laughlin, 217 Md. 576, 142 
A.2d 810, 814, 80 A.L.R.2d 731 (1958); Cozby v. Armstrong, 205 S.W.2d 403, 408 
(Tex.Civ.App.1947); RFS, Inc. v. Cohen, 772 S.W.2d 713, 714-15 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) ("so long 
as the dominant estate receives all of the uses that it bargained for and is entitled to under the 
easement, equity will not restrict the free and full utilization of the servient estate"); Sedillo Title 
Guaranty, Inc. v. Wagner, 80 N.M. 429, 457 P.2d 361, 363-64 (1969); Stewart v. Compton, 549 
S.W.2d 832,833 (Ky.Ct.App.1977); Brian v. Bowlus, 399 So.2d 545,549 (La.1980). 
Significantly, the MacMeekin court stated, "It should be noted that Kentucky and 
Louisiana have statutes expressly permitting relocation of easements and thus are of very limited 
precedential value in this state." MacMeekin, 11 1 Wash.App. at 203,45 P.3d at 577, n.3. Idaho 
also has a statute expressly permitting the relocation of a roadway easement, while Washington 
and Arizona do not. 
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Additionally, Idaho courts have historically looked to the Restatement on property issues 
when little or no case authority exists; for example, in Boydstun Beach Ass h v. Allen, 11 1 Idaho 
370, 378, 723P.2d 914, 922 (Ct.App. 1986) the Court of Appeals turned to the Restatement for 
guidance in its analysis regarding use. 
The Restatement (Third) of Property provides: 
Except where the location and dimensions are determined by the instrument or 
circumstances surrounding creation of a servitude, they are determined as follows: 
(1) The owner of the servient estate has the right within a reasonable time to 
specify a location that is reasonably suited to'cany out the purpose of the 
servitude. 
(2) The dimensions are those reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the servitude. 
(3) Unless expressly denied by the terms of an easement, as defined in 5 1.2, the 
owner of the servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes in the location 
or dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner's expense, to permit normal 
use or development of the servient estate, but only if the changes do not 
(a) Significantly lessen the utility of the easement, 
(b) Increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its use and enjoyment, 
or 
(c) Frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created. 
RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES 5 4.8(3) (2000). The Restatement Section 
4.8(3) provides that unless the terms of the easement expressly deny relocation, the owner of the 
servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes in location at his own expense, so long as it 
does lessen the utility, increase the burdens, or frustrate the purpose of the easement. The 
Restatement is instructive and has been relied upon previously by Idaho courts in addressing 
property issues. 
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Appellants argued at the hearing before the district court that the Restatement is not 
applicable due to the language contained in the introductory paragraph of the Restatement that 
provides, "Except where the location and dimensions are determined by the instrument or 
circumstances surrounding creation of a servitude, they are determined as follows ..." Appellants 
argued that the Restatement does not apply because the easement at issue in this case is described 
in the deed. However, subpart (3) of the Restatement still applies to express easements as well 
as easements by implication or prescription. MacMeekin, 11 Wash.App. at 204, 45 P.3d at 578 
("[Section 4.8(3) of the Restatement (Third)] applies to express easements as well as those 
acquired by implication or prescription."). 
Comment (f) to Section 4.8(3) is instructive and provides: 
f: Servient owner's right to change iocation or dimensions of an easement, 
subsection (3). The rule stated in this section grants the servient owner the right to 
change the location or dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner's 
expense, if the changes do not significantly lessen the utility of the easement, 
increase the burdens on the holder of the easement benefit, or frustrate the 
purpose for which the easement was created. This rule is limited in its application 
to easements as defined in 9 1.2, which include affirmative rights to enter and use 
land possessed by another, but do not include negative use rights (negative 
easements or restrictive covenants). This rule applies unless expressly negated by 
the easement instrument. If the purchaser of an easement wishes to retain control 
over any change in location, the instrument should be drafted to accomplish that 
result. 
This rule is designed to permit development of the servient estate to the extent it 
can be accomplished without unduly interfering with the legitimate interests of 
the easement holder. It complements the rule that the easement holder may 
increase use of the easement to permit normal development of the dominant 
estate, if the increase does not unduly burden the servient estate. See 3 4.9. This 
rule is not reciprocal. It permits unilateral relocation only by the owner of the 
servient estate; it does not entitle the owner ofthe easement to relocate the 
easement. The reasons for the rule are that it will increase overall utility because it 
will increase the value of the servient estate without diminishing the value of the 
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dominant estate and it will encourage the use of easements and lower their price 
by decreasing the risk the easements will unduly restrict future development of 
the servient estate. In addition, permitting the servient owner to change the 
location under the enumerated circumstances provides a fair trade-off for the 
vulnerability of the servient estate to increased use of the easement to 
accommodate changes in technology and development of the dominant estate. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 4.8(3) (2000), Comment (0. 
Appellant's reliance on Villager Condominium Ass'n v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 986, 
829 P.2d 1335 (1992) is misplaced because that case dealt with expansion of an easement and 
the party making the expansion, Idaho Power, was the dominant estate owner and not the 
servient estate owner. The district court found this to be a significant distinction in noting that, 
"...those cases do not support the Defendant's position because it was the dominant estate 
seeking to relocate the easement in violation of the servient owner's property rights. Here, the 
servient owner seeks to relocate." (R. Vol. I, p. 89.) 
Appellant's further claim that Statewide's reference to Idaho Code Section 42-1207 
actually supports Appellant's position rather than Statewide's position. To the contrary, the fact 
that Section 42-1207 includes a specific provision requiring written permission from the owner of 
a ditch prior to relocation demonstrates that the Legislature knew how to include such a provision 
in a statute, but specifically left that requirement out of Section 55-313. Section 42-1207 permits 
relocation of a ditch if there is written consent and it does not cause injury. Section 5 55-313 
permits relocation of a roadway if there is no obstruction to motor vehicle travel and it does not 
cause injury. Consequently, the absence of a provision requiring written permission from the 
dominant owner in Section 55-313 supports Statewide's position. 
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Finally, Appellants' argument that their position is supported by this Court's decision in 
Turner v. Cold Springs Canyon, L.P., 143 Idaho 227, 141 P.3d 1096 (2000) is without merit. In 
Turner, the district court denied the defendant's request to relocate the easement because it never 
pled or addressed whether it was entitled to relocate the easement. This Court held, "As a result, 
the district court correctly declined to rule on whether the easement was open to relocation." 
Turner, 143 Idaho at 229, 141 P.3d at 1098. 
Appellants make no mention in their brief of the only published decision in Idaho that 
does address Section 55-313, Benninger v. Derzjkld, 142 Idaho 486, 129 P.3d 1235 (2006). In 
Benninger, the dominant estate owners brought a nuisance action against a servient estate owner, 
alleging interference with a driveway easement. The servient estate owner counterclaimed for a 
decree quieting title and relocation of the easement, pursuant to Section 55-313, if an easement 
was found by the court. The trial court issued a memorandum decision and held, among other 
things, that an easement existed and that the servient estate owner was entitled to modify and 
relocate the driveway to its current location. The relocation issue was not one of the issues 
raised on appeal to this Court. 
Additionally, other Idaho decisions have discussed the rights of a servient estate owner. 
"There is nothing in this Court's case law that prohibits a servient estate holder from limiting the 
use of the easement to authorized users." Marshall v Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 682, 946 P.2d 975, 
982 (1997). "This Court has also concluded that a servient estate holder is entitled to make 
'reasonable regulations' concerning the use of the easement. No parallel right for dominant 
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P.2d 276,282 (1999). The Drew court explained, 
In Idaho, "an easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose 
that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner." 
(citations omitted). As long as Sorensen [dominant estate owner] is able to use 
the easement for access to his land for the specific purpose for which the 
easement was granted, without unreasonable interference, he has received 
everything to which he was legally entitled. 
Id. 
The express language of Idaho Code Section 55-313 permits Statewide to relocate the 
roadway. The only published Idaho decision addressing the relocation of a roadway under 55-3 13 
permits relocation. Therefore, consent is not required of the Appellants in order to relocate the 
road. 
2. Statewide's relocation does not violate a constitutionally protected 
right. 
Appellants claim that use of Section 55-3 13 by a servient estate owner would constitute a 
"taking" under Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Specifically, Appellants claim that their property is being taken 
without just compensation. Appellants fail to cite to any legal authority to support their claim 
that the relocation of an easement constitutes a "taking" in violation of their constitutional rights. 
Rather, Appellant's rely on Cohen v. Larson, 125 Idaho 82, 84, 867 P.2d 956, 958 (1993). 
I-Iowever, the Cohen court dealt with one party condemning the real property of another to create 
an easement for purely private purposes. The Cohen Court explained that while the legal 
concept of eminent domain generally applies only to the government it acknowledged that "there 
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are certain Idaho cases which have upheld the right of private entities to exercise the power of 
eminent domain in certain limited circumstances." Cohen, 125 Idaho at 84, 867 P.2d at 958. In 
all of these cases the proposed use for which a party's land was taken was to serve the public of 
the state. Id. Moreover, this Court stated, "The proposed use need not be strictly public, but it 
must at least benefit the public welfare or the economy of the state." Id., citing Potlach Lumber 
Co., v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769,785,88 P. 426,431 (1906). This Court explained: 
The notion of public use is a flexible one depending on the needs and wants of the 
community, and we note that the public, the legislature, and the courts of this state 
have demonstrated an awareness of public benefits, including environmental and 
population concerns, that perhaps were not recognized a century ago. 
Id. The district court correctly rejected Appellants' argument under Cohen because "the 
circumstances presented by this case are properly analyzed based on the plain language of 
section 55-313." (R. Vol. I, p. 89.) 
The United States Supreme Court recently held that a city's use of eminent domain, 
through a private organization, in furtherance of economic development plan satisfied the 
constitutional "public use" requirement. Kelo v. Ciiy ofNew London, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469, 
125 S.Ct 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005). In Kelo, the New London Development Corporation 
("NLDC") was a private nonprofit entity established to assist the city in planning economic 
development. The NLDC submitted a development plan to the city and obtained approval of a 
plan focusing on 90 acres of property, which included the property owned by petitioner Susette 
Kelo. The United States Supreme Court made clear that a sovereign may not take the property of 
A for the sole purpose of transferring to another private party B, even though A is paid for just 
compensation. The Court further explained, "on the other hand, it is equally clear that a State 
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may transfer property from one private party to another if future "use by the puhlic" is the 
purpose of the taking." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court 
has held, "this Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put 
into use for the general public." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court 
has broadened its interpretation of public use as "public purpose." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480. 
Idaho courts have held that a private entity may exercise the power of eminent domain in 
certain limited circumstances. See Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 556, 155 
P. 680 (1916)(condemnation for land for public use is permitted under the Idaho Constitution, 
Article I, Section 14, for the complete development of the state's resources, though the public 
has no direct interest in the proceedings, and the main end sought is private gain); Potlach 
Lumber Co. v. Peterson, i2  idaho 769, 88 P. 426 (1906)(The term "public use," as used in the 
Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 14, means public usefulness and productiveness of general 
benefit and the term is a flexible one, and necessarily has been of constant growth as new public 
uses have developed). 
The law does not require Statewide's present development to he for purely public use, hut 
rather must in part serve a public purpose, which it does. The development that has been 
approved requires the relocation of the Old Easement. The New Easement and roadway will be 
dedicated to public use and will facilitate the development of the subdivision that was approved 
by Valley County. It is reasonable to assume that the developed lots will increase the County's 
tax base and bring in more property tax revenue. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
548340-3 
Page 26 
C. No genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Appellants' alleged injury. 
The relocation of the roadway does not cause injury to Appellants and no material issue of 
fact exists regarding an alleged injury. Appellants assert that they will suffer personal and 
commercial injury as a result of the relocation of the easement. Idaho Code Section 55-313 
provides that a party may relocate a private road's access if the relocation will not "otherwise 
injury any person or persons using or interested in such access." The district court considered the 
Appellants' testimony regarding their alleged injury. Appellants claimed that the relocation 
would create a less direct route to their parcels, which would require them to drive heav y 
equipment (often covered with mud, dirt and grime) through a residential street, which could 
cause safety problems and concems with residents who live in the area. (Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 118, 
134, i40-41.) Lonnie King testified that he plowed snow for some of the other Appellants and the 
relocation would interfere with his snow plowing business. (Id.) Finally, Larry Monkarsh 
testified that he thought the relocation would pose safety issues affecting a driver's ability to see 
oncoming traffic at the access point. (Id.) 
There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Larry Monkarsh's safety concerns 
because the relocation has already been approved by the Valley County because it issued 
Conditional Use Permit No. 05-31, recorded as Instrument No. 298630, records of Valley 
County, Idaho. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 41 , l  10.) Conditional Use Permit No. 05-3 1 provides for the 
construction of a new roadway for purposes of access to the improved lots on Parcel 1 and for 
ingress and egress to the dominant estate. (Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 4 1 , l  11.) The claim that the road 
provides a "less direct route" to Appellants' parcels is also not an issue of fact because the New 
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Easement is 375 feet to the west of the Old Easement, therefore whether it is more or less of a 
direct route depends on whether Appellants are travelling from the west or the east. If they are 
travelling from the west, it is a shorter distance. The claim that dirt and grime may fill off their 
trucks simply does not make sense because the same safety concern would exist with regard to 
the Old Easement. 
Finally, with regard to Lonnie King's claim that the relocation would harm his agreement 
to provide snowplowing services to other Appellants; there was no testimony that the other 
Appellants would retain his services in the future and there are no assurances that he would 
retain any future business. Consequently, any such assertion is mere speculation. Most 
importantly, as the district court explained, the injury alleged by Appellants is not the injury 
contemplated by the statute, ''injury in the context of relocation of easements under section 55- 
3 13 contemplates a taking or lessening of value to the dominant estate holders. No evidence is 
before the Court of this occurring." (R. Vol. I, p. 91.) The district court's finding is consistent 
with the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) that provides, "The rule stated in this 
section grants the servient owner the right to change the location or dimensions of an easement, 
at the servient owner's expense, if the changes do not significantly lessen the utility of the 
easement, increase the burdens on the holder of the easement benefit, or fmstrate the purpose for 
which the easement was created." RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES 5 4.8(3) 
(2000), Comment (f). The Restatement further provides, "The reasons for the mle are that it will 
increase overall utility because it will increase the value of the servient estate without 
diminishing the value of the dominant estate and it will encourage the use of easements and 
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lower their price by decreasing the risk the easements will unduly restrict future development of 
the servient estate." (Id.) 
Lastly, Appellants claim that the district court "is obligated to hear and consider evidence 
as to the extent and value of the injury that the Appellants will suffer ..." (Appellant's Brief, p. 
20.) However, Appellants failed to present any evidence as to the extent of or value of their 
alleged injuries. This Court recently explained that a court is "permitted to draw probable 
inferences from the uncontradicted evidence because it would serve as the trier of fact, it [is] not 
permitted to make conclusive findings with regard to issues upon which the parties submitted 
conflicting evidence." Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 
Idaho 117, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). There is no conflicting evidence in this case, and the district 
court was free to draw probable inferences as the trier of fact. 
D. Idaho Code Section 55-313 is not unconstitutional because the relocation of 
an easement does not constitute a "taking" and Appellant's due process 
rights have not been violated. 
The Appellants claim that Section 55-3 13 is unconstitutional because it denies Appellants' 
due process rights. Appellants rely on Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. Drummond, 77 Idaho 36,287 
P.2d 288 (1955) in support of their argument. Yellowstone is not applicable to this case. 
Yellowstone involved a condemnation proceeding wherein a pipeline builder sought to condemn a 
right-of-way for a pipeline across certain mining claims owned by appellants. Therefore, the 
holders of the mining claim were the servient estate owners, not the dominant estate owners. 
Moreover, the pipeline builder moved under Idaho Code Section 7-717, prior to its amendment in 
1953, which permitted a party to condemn property of a landowner upon payment of damages. 
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This Court held that the former Section 7-717 was unconstitutional because it did not provide due 
process prior to the condemnation. Idaho Code Section 55-313 addresses the relocation of an 
easement. As set forth above, the relocation of an easement is not a "taking." Appellants still 
have roadway access to their property and motor vehicle travel has not been obstructed nor have 
Appellants suffered any injury. Section 7-717 addressed discussed condemnation of property of 
the landowner, which in this case would be Statewide. Neither Yellowstone nor Idaho Code 
Section 7-717 are applicable to this case because the relocation of an easement is not a 
condemnation and is not a "taking" as set forth above. Moreover, Appellants have received due 
process through the administrative procedures employed by Valley County in issuing the 
Condition Use Permit, which involved notice and hearing. 
i i i .  CONCLUSION 
Statewide respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
and find that Statewide, as the servient estate owner, is entitled under Idaho Code Section 55-313 
to relocate the Old Easement to the New Easement without the consent of the Appellants. 
DATED this 1 2 ' ~  day of March, 2010. 
Attorneys for Revondent 
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